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The Eurozone continues to experience low growth, while unemployment remains a substantial problem in
several European states. Alison Johnston and Aidan Regan write that despite these issues, the
European policy response has remained broadly similar since the crisis: reducing public spending
and imposing structural reforms in periphery states to try and improve their competitiveness. They
argue that there are far more fundamental problems in the Eurozone and that one potential way to
solve these would be to encourage wage rises in northern economies such as Germany.
The Eurozone’s crisis never seems to end. Italy has re-entered recession. The French government
is in turmoil over austerity. Youth unemployment is at a historic high in Spain. Increased taxes are
crippling low-income earners in Ireland. Extreme poverty is growing in Greece. Wage stagnation
continues in Germany. Yet the European policy response remains the same. Reduce public
spending and impose structural reforms in the euro periphery and hope that cost competitiveness
will kick start economic recovery. Any suggestion that countries are struggling to recover because
they lack tools of adjustment or monetary sovereignty is politely ignored. Monetary union is not the
problem.
We disagree. In a forthcoming Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies discussion paper, we argue that the
absence of national adjustment tools within a monetary union has significant implications for the co-existence of
Europe’s diverse models of capitalism. While gaping external lending and trade imbalances between the Eurozone
North and South are identified as an underlying instigator of the crisis, these regional imbalances were heavily
contained prior to the launch of the single currency (see figure 1). We do not find this coincidental. The rise in
external imbalances within the Eurozone can partially be attributed to how monetary union removed important
adjustment mechanisms in the real exchange rate between highly coordinated, low inflation-prone export-led growth
models, which congregate in EMU’s Northern economies, and uncoordinated, high inflation-prone domestic
demand-led growth models, which congregate in EMU’s periphery.
Figure 1: External balances vis-à-vis all trading partners in EMU’s Northern and Southern Economies (1980-
2014)
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Note: Northern economies include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the
Netherlands. Southern economies include Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. We
present Southern external lending balances with and without Greece due to the fact that the
country lacked external lending data before 1995. Source: EU AMECO Database (2014).
In changing its member-states’ real exchange rate calculus so that competitive imbalances became purely a
function of relative inflation (the nominal exchange rate disappears for countries sharing the same currency),
monetary union created an economic environment that granted a persistent real exchange rate advantage to its
wage-moderating, export-led economies, allowing them to accumulate persistent current account, and external net
lending, surpluses vis-à-vis their southern trading partners.
Europe’s Northern export-led models have always been successful in delivering wage moderation and low inflation
relative to their Southern domestic demand-led trading partners. Yet prior to the late 1990s, these historical
divergences in inflation did not produce significant external imbalances between these two growth regimes. This
was due to the presence of important readjustment mechanisms between high and low inflation countries within the
real exchange rate – the nominal exchange rate multiplied by the ratio of domestic to foreign inflation – under a
monetary system of multiple currencies.
In a soft-peg or flexible exchange rate system, competitive adjustment between low-inflation prone export-led and
high-inflation prone demand-led growth models was facilitated through the nominal exchange rate. Inflation prone
currencies in Europe’s domestic demand-led economies lost their value via depreciation/devaluation, compensating
for high inflation’s direct influence on the real exchange rate. These devalued currencies also produced higher risk
premia, which were priced into (higher) interest rates, limiting the scale of external borrowing. Likewise, currencies
in low inflation prone growth models gained value, leading to nominal exchange rate appreciations, which undercut
the direct influence of low inflation on the real exchange rate. Because the nominal exchange rate acted as a
competitiveness buffer, divergences in the real exchange rate, and consequently external balances, between low
and high inflation prone growth models was limited.
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Contained external imbalances between domestic demand-led growth models also occurred in hard currency fixed-
exchange rate systems where the nominal exchange rate was fixed between countries. In this type of currency
arrangement, contained external imbalances were delivered via national central banks enforcing inflation
convergence. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, national central banks of EMU member-states committed
themselves to a hard currency policy, either directly through an inflation target (Germany after the second World
War, and all EMU member-states under the Maastricht criteria) or indirectly via the adoption of a (narrow band) fixed
exchange rate with a low inflation anchor currency (Austria, Belgium, France and the Netherlands during the early
years of the European Monetary System).
Through downward wage and price adjustments, these central banks helped deliver inflation convergence between
diverse models of capitalism. In the inflation-prone South, national governments, unions and employers responded
to (Maastricht’s) low inflation mandate by negotiating social pacts to manage their domestic fiscal and wage policies.
Inflation convergence and a fixed nominal exchange rate delivered real exchange rate convergence, which further
limited external imbalances between EMU’s North and South.
Monetary union removed these two adjustment mechanisms that facilitated the co-existence of Europe’s diverse
models of capitalism. Unlike national central banks, the European Central Bank did not deliver inflation convergence
between EMU’s member-states, because its inflation mandate applied to the Eurozone as a whole. Under the single
currency, member-states’ real exchange rates vis-à-vis their Eurozone trading partners became purely a function of
inflation. EMU’s new exchange rate calculus meant that the real exchange rate could slowly but persistently diverge
between the EMU’s low inflation prone export-led and high inflation prone demand-led growth regimes. This was not
necessarily due to the resurgence in wage inflation or structural rigidities in the labour market in southern Europe,
where inflation was lower in the 2000’s than it was in the 1990’s. Rather it was due to wage deflation in the
coordinated market economies of northern Europe, most notably in Germany.
All of this suggests that the problems of the monetary union are an internal relation between growth regimes with
divergent inflation performances. As long as some member-states have domestic institutions that grant them a
comparative advantage in producing low inflation, they will continue to realise a persistent real-exchange rate
advantage over their high-inflation domestic demand-led counter parts in southern Europe. The creation of a
banking or fiscal union is unlikely to compensate for the lack of adjustment mechanisms in the real exchange rate
that underpin this external imbalance. Rather, adjustment must be delivered through the supranational management
of inflation differentials between EMU’s member-states. In a perverted sense, Troika-induced austerity policy is
partially accomplishing this by promoting deflationary adjustments in peripheral Europe through their devastating
effects on incomes. However, this inflation adjustment has been entirely, and unfairly, one-sided.
As EMU’s domestic-demand led models pursue painful austerity measures, no attempt has been made to correct
the excessive levels of wage moderation in the North in general and Germany in particular, which is a core factor in
explaining the crisis. If Europe wants to end its crisis it requires a growth solution; the coordination of robust wage
growth in its northern economies, in order to facilitate demand recovery in the south, may be one way it can
accomplish this.
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